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No worst there is none
Save that the winds blow wilder...
- G.M. Hopkins
Efficiency m atters... in a poor 
economy waste is a sin.
- Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere
Time past and time future
Are both, perhaps, contained in time present.
If all time is eternally present,
All time is irredeemable.
Redeem the time.
- T.S. Eliott
As Krishna to Arjuna on the field of battle 
Not farewell but fare forward,
Voyagers.
- Pali Canon
World Council o f Churches (WCC) Seminar, Geneva October 1999
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PRELUDE
Why should Churches be involved with economists and economics? Such are not the Kingdom 
o f Heaven, are they? That is a not unusual and a most persistent question.
The answer can perhaps be summed up in two additional questions:
a. Since the world is the Lord's and all that therein is, are economic issues o f major significance 
in that world and to most human beings?
b. Do economists have anything useful and/or illuminating to say about economics?
If the answer is yes to both questions then Christians and Churches do need to address economic 
issues and enter into discourse with economists because o f - not instead o f or in addition to - the 
Gospel agenda.
Doubtless - like all issues o f justice, equity and power in the historic, present, future created 
world - that course o f action entails risks. It also poses problems o f divisions o f labour.
Churches' expertise and authority is (or ought to be) on norms, relationships, limits and processes 
not detached economic analysis and policymaking as such. The need for access to and 
comprehension o f the latter to inform the former is one thing; the case for a 'Christian 
econometrics' is something else again (and rather less plausible except as part o f a theocratic 
anschaung).
The inverse o f the foregoing line o f contention is that economists, as economists, are not 
particularly expert on overall human goals or values. To the extent neo-liberalism claims to be a 
complete value system it is a socio-political value model (e.g. von Mises and von Hayek neither
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seen as o f  much importance as an economist) not an economic one. Even many leading neo­
liberal economists, e.g. Milton Friedman, would agree with that proposition.
Economics does contend that other things being equal more material resource availability is 
usually better than less - a proposition hardly inconsistent with not living by bread alone nor with 
feeding the 5,000 very efficiently indeed? Economists do speak o f efficiency but, when careful, 
relate it to achieving specified ends. These ends are very often exogenous to (taken from 
outside) the economic processual analysis. If one specifies that all households should have 
entitlements (rights to goods and services - public as well as private) at or above some minimum 
that specification means that the same tools o f economic analysis and the same economic 
relationships will specify different policies, programmes and institutions in respect both to 
production and to safety nets than if maximising production and its rate o f growth were the only 
goals. There is no need to devise completely new sets o f economic relationships or analytical 
tools to introduce and to identify resource efficient means to justice, peace or sustainability 
(integrity o f creation). The actual problem lies in defining JPC in precise enough terms to allow 
formulation o f resource (human, institutional, processual, material financial) input/goal 
achievement processes operationally. To the extent discourse with economists forces applied 
theologists to do that it is, in practice, doing them a considerable service. Nothing discredits 
Christian economic proposals more than failure to relate goals to practicable means o f  attaining 
them or to entering into detailed, highly technical economic policy formulations while displaying 
apparent expertise. For example a serious Jubilee proposition in respect to poor country debt 
needs to specify what levels o f writedown are needed to be meaningful and the practicability o f 
achieving/implementing/financing them. It is, however, both unnecessary and probably unwise 
to enter into detailed controversy on highly technical, detailed issues o f economic analyses o f -
e.g. - alternative financing mechanisms for Bank/Fund writedowns - say from profits flow by 
actual gold sales, by gold revaluation without actual sale or with nominal sales to central banks. 
The latter choices are not devoid o f equity/distribution issues - e.g. lower gold prices are very 
hard on e.g. Tanzania. Zimbabwe, Papua-New Guinea, Ghana, Mali, South Africa which is not a 
desirable side effect. Indeed no likely level o f debt writeoff would offset a $50 per ounce fall in 
the world gold price to Mali, Ghana or Tanzania. But while Christian coalitions for debt w riteoff 
in these countries do need to argue their cases against the gold sale option on equity grounds 
there is no need for a Jubilee Coalition to develop expertise on alternative financing means but
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every reason not to specify are choice unless it has done so. Similar dilemmas exist in respect to 
child labour. In Bangkok, Manila, Cebu City and Davao poor households whose children work 
have higher school enrolment rates and lower child malnutrition than those in which they do not. 
Therefore a blanket ban on such labour - however well intended and even however desirable as a 
2025 goal - is not an optimal short term campaign issue as opposed to as more selective 
regulation and standards setting campaign varying in specifies with specific contexts, a point 
UNICEF has, perhaps rather quietly, taken.
Yes, Christians should be concerned with economics and in discourse with economists. Poverty 
is the overriding issue for a very large portion o f humanity and economics is very much relevant 
to poverty (including exclusion) and ways to reducing it. But no, economic analysis neither is 
(nor ought to be) a substitute for as opposed to be a potentially useful tool for exploring and 
informing applied theology nor is it a tool that can be used without bothering to understand it nor 
with the expectation o f certain precise answers. "What is a just price?", for example, is a 
question which poses very difficult normative and economic analytical issues - as Christians 
from Saint Thomas to the Jubilee Coalition have discovered.
I
PROLEGEMONA
1. African economic, social and political performance for the past two decades has been, on 
average dismal, with differing headlines for the two decades:
a. 1980-1989 Economic Calamities and Governance Decay
b. 1990-1999 W ar Catastrophes and Malgovernance
2. Africa is not homogenous let alone monolithic: Botswana is not Lesotho, nor Tanzania, 
Uganda nor Mali, Burkina Faso nor Somaliland, Somalia. Regionally SADCC is not IGAD. 
Neither economic potential nor external contexts fully explain the divergences - a sign o f 
hope - although they do influence them (e.g. Lesotho has not the fiscal and forex flows to
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become Botswana-II). Similarly three are many positive exceptions nationally - e.g. child 
nutrition in Tanzania - and much more broadly - e.g. child vaccination and immunisation.
3. Therefore while there are challenges affecting many countries (e.g. expanding humanly 
acceptable livelihoods is no easier in Botswana than in Mozambique) their interactions, the 
potential for and priorities among actions and the socio political and political dynamics o f 
particular counties vary radically and structurally not cosmetically nor marginally.
4. The issue/theme clusters used to organise these reflections are:
a. Poverty and Livelihood
b. Peace and Governance
c. Growth and Macro Economic Parameters
d. Africans and External Allies.
The basic normative presupposition is that set out by Mwalimu Nyerere that the only 
justification of and judgement on development, (broadly defined) is human beings 
perceived as its subjects and operators not its objects and targets.
II
POVERTY AND LIVELIHOOD
5. Most Africans (90%) are relatively poor by world standards. Over 50% are poor by standard 
estimates o f personal consumption; 35% plus are absolutely poor (60% of expenditure 
needed for minimum nutritionally viable diet/no margin to absorb shocks without severe 
deprivation); 20% + abjectly poor/'destitute' (barely surviving/at severe risk o f death from 
any further adverse shocks). These are the worst proportions for any region in the world 
(passing South Asia as its poverty fell and SSA's rose) and - despite some sharp falls since 
1990 (e.g. Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Somaliland - the overall trend is, at best, stagnant.
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6. Poverty in Africa - as elsewhere - has differing subsets of characteristics and durations:
a. stochastic - shock caused and potentially (but not necessarily) largely reversed (e.g. one 
year droughts);
b. cyclical - related to 'sustained' economic stagnation (in the absence o f war, year after year 
falls in total real output are rare) or decline;
c. catastrophe - war prevention o f production and/or commerce (especially in rural areas);
d. chronic - linked to disabilities and/or age which cripple household productivity;
e. endemic - nationally mismatch o f households and livelihood opportunities, at household 
level too high a ratio o f mouths to feed to healthy/skilled hands to produce/earn.
However in the absence o f livelihood/asset recovery a, b, c tend to collapse into d (via 
malnutrition and low access to inadequate health services) and/or e (via inability to mobilise 
complementary resources for the hands to use).
7. A checklist o f identifiable groups which usually comprise most poor people includes:
a. refugees and internally displaced persons (up to half the rural population in war
zones);
b. single able bodied adult households o f four or more members (in practice predominately 
female headed)
c. aged (60+) person headed households;
d. handicapped person headed households;
e. child headed households (predominately resulting from war and/or Aids);
f. households with 2 or more 'new' children as a result o f war or Aids orphaning;
g. weak indigenous minority households (e.g. San/Basarwa o f Namibia/Botswana, 
Swahili/'Bantu' o f Somalia, Sudanic groups in SE Ethiopia e.g. Gambella).
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h. 'isolated' (physically, socially or from access to land) households who either have no/or 
nearly no access to the resources (especially land but sometimes tools and livestock) to 
complement their hands in producing little access to transport/markets to make 
production effective and/or to human contacts/institutions/social capital networks which 
relate with them as human beings (cf plight of'Bantu ' under apartheid in the Old South 
Africa and the - in Somali terminology - Swahili 'Bantu' o f Somalia).
i. 'Vulnerable' households when calamities (drought, recession, flood, accident, household 
members' illness) or catastrophes (war, destructive civil disorder, household members' 
criminal or substance/pastime abuses) have pitched into poverty.
8. These are not in themselves analytical nor causal categories - albeit they contain strong clues 
as to underlying causes and dynamics. Nor are they separate - often they overlap as with a 
displaced, female headed San household in the Kalahari desert. They are potentially 
operational ones because they allow identification o f poor people, o f problematic 
characteristics and o f  possible programmatic interventions whether by civil society or 
governance (historic, local or national). Many research approaches produce highly 
suggestive 'typical' poverty profiles which relate characteristics, but do not necessarily 
identify key dynamic interactions nor - especially - actual poor households/isolated  
individuals/groups with whom policy could interact.
9. Another aspect are the normative, social and political divides among inequality, inequity 
and iniquity as causes o f poverty. General poverty in a context o f personal, household, civil 
society and state priority to reducing it and o f relatively equitable access to opportunities to 
do so is not destabilising and may be mobilising; even inequality if  seen as largely the result 
o f effort, performance, good luck is, up to a point, often also socio-politically acceptable; 
iniquity in gaining by occult means despite or (worse) because o f mass poverty is violently 
destabilising vide the differences between Tanzania and Kenya or Nigeria.
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10. The main themes in addressing poverty are:
a. livelihood enhancement
b. basic services access (including for this purpose law-order-justice, physical and market 
infrastructure)
c. safety net provision
d. gender (both from a human equity and an economic efficiency perspective).
11. In poor countries (and in SSA only Seychelles, Mauritius and Botswana can conceivably be 
categorised as non poor) livelihood enhancement not redistribution must be the central and 
the driving means toward poverty reduction. Total domestic resources and the high cost o f 
redistributing by taking away - as opposed to out o f growth - mean domestic resources 
reallocation is a 'bridge out' road. International transfers per capita to Africa have declined 
50% in real terms over the decade and can be projected to continue on that route (however 
normatively wrong that may be). Investment for profit is only likely (or humanly useful) in a 
context o f livelihood expansion and augmentation.
12. Livelihoods in Africa (and elsewhere) are complex both as to multiple sources with different 
roles (e.g. secure base versus upside potential) and dynamics and as to intra household time, 
income receipt and expenditure obligation budgeting. None is uniform across urban/rural nor 
across zones and none is static over time. Since 1970 women's directly productive (income 
including household food, shelter, fuel and water) activity has risen absolutely and as a 
proportion o f total. Overall household labour input has - on the whole - risen with the 
recovery o f average household consumption (often to near previous peak levels even when 
output per capita has not fully recovered) probably implying much the same per capita 
personal consumption, less taxes, less savings, less access to public services and lower 
'payoff per hour worked as opposed to earlier 1970's or 1960's peaks. However, the averages 
contain very wide scatters -not least between armed conflict plagued and peaceful countries.
13. Rural livelihood enhancement (for the family small farming sector) in Africa is often 
relatively straightforward intellectually and - if  given priority - in terms o f provision o f
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resource input level requirement. The basic problems are institutional, articulation - testing - 
feedback and user consultation before, during and in monitoring o f implementation. In most 
o f SSA 50% increases in average rural income could be gained along these routes in 5 to 7 
years.
14. Urban livelihoods, partly because they are usually more multi source, are harder to analyse 
and to programme in articulated strategy. Some elements - reduction o f pointless or 
expensive (in time as well as finance terms) regulation, access to commercial credit, market 
access are know in general but not on broad fronts o f specifics. Others relate to the fact that 
the dominant large city income source is wages as is the dominant market for 'informal' 
goods and services so that a dynamic formal wage sector is key to a dynamic set o f 'informal' 
income flows.
15. Food is a two faceted issue. The first requirement is physical supply - often not nationally 
achievable physically in calamity years or catastrophe situations - and the second household 
entitlement (production, earnings or safety net) which is usually shaky to near absent for over 
20% in 'normal' years and exacerbated by droughts, floods, civil disorder and war. Without 
adequate physical food there cannot be rapid reduction o f malnutrition. Without adequate 
entitlements (including safety nets as well as production) physical food is not sufficient. 
Reducing malnutrition (like basic services) provides direct human welfare gains but is 
equally crucial to present and future productivity. The physical supply requirement (which 
may nationally be met best by exporting - e.g. - meat and/or fish and importing grain as in 
Botswana, Somaliland, Namibia) is at present met globally but it is in permanent medium 
term peril, the 1945-95 4% plus annual trend growth o f food output is unprecedented and 
cannot continue without sustained and accelerated research and extension based productivity 
gains.
16. Production/earned livelihoods alone are not enough - particularly in calamity/catastrophe 
zones and years;
a. old aged households heads;
b. poor families taking in 'new' (orphaned) children;
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c. handicapped and child headed families;
d. single adult headed households o f 4 or more
e. persons and households afflicted by calamities or catastrophes
will in general need income transfers. Increasingly - partly for social transformation 
reasons but equally because o f household and community safety net overload - historic safety 
nets are eroding generally or cannot bear the full weight o f larger numbers o f persons in these 
categories.
17. What can be done varies widely with output per capita, economic and demographic structures 
and state revenue to output ratios and links. Among the possibilities in some countries are:
a. universal old age pension (perhaps only for South Africa, Namibia, Seychelles,
Mauritius, Botswana to date);
b. rural drought (or other calamity) survival and sustaining of ability to produce again (or 
cash for work to buy food) entitlement mechanisms;
c. catastrophe survival (and post war rehabilitation) support for refugees and internally 
displaced persons;
d. selective urban very low income supplement schemes linked to readily identifiable age, 
disability or mother/child underweight and no weight criterion (as implement with some 
success in Mozambique);
e. support for households willing to include (usually kin) orphans (especially where HIV 
has destroyed often adequate previous mechanisms);
f. encouraging/supporting social sector (not least religious bodies) care for smaller, more 
diverse, less readily identifiable immiserised household/person calamaties..
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18. Basic services (broadly defined) are key both to production now and potential for 
production growth tomorrow. The main heads include:
a. law, order, peace and stability in the sense o f personal freedom to engage in ordinary 
activities without fear o f violent interference (by anybody from invader through bandit to 
state official) and with courts, police, army to protect that freedom and halt violations 
plus freedom from frequent radical institutional and policy changes totally upending life 
and livelihood patterns (e.g. substituting private for coop or state agricultural marketing 
without ascertaining the private enterprises do have physical, personnel and 
financial/access to credit capacities to do the job);
b. primary and adult applied education;
c. primary (including preventative and educational) health services;
d. accessible, pure water and environmental sanitation;
e. basic local (both rural and poor urban neighbourhood) physical infrastructure;
f. effective access to at least moderately competitive markets (even if  this requires 
commercial lending to non-poor business units because without them the rural poor are 
doomed to remain poor);
g. production oriental extension and research services (especially but not only agricultural);
h. consequential secondary and tertiary education and health and other sector requirements 
(e.g. teaching hospitals, teacher training colleges, water technician institutes).
These are key to both household and macro economic production and productivity 
enhancement and thus to direct and enabling climate/context empowerment o f poor people.
19. Among basic services water and health may deserve special attention. W ater is usually 
given a step child status - almost literally in UN circles where fau te  de mieux UNICEF has 
taken over the lead role. There are three cases for water:
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a. improved health in respect to water borne diseases and environmental sanitation.
b. massive labour time savings - predominantly by women and girls - from reduced (by up 
to 3 hours a day) water collection time;
c. consequential higher productivity for women and girls, improvement in school 
attendance and completion ratios for girls and reduced women's work (overloads). 
Unfortunately many water ministries are too gender insensitive to note these cases, even 
though it is institutionally in their interest to do so.
In practice neither the third nor, especially, the second consideration is usually integrated into 
water sector, let alone overall, strategic planning.
20. Within health service/health education cluster five sub aeas stand out
a. vaccination/immunisation (including moving toward malaria and HIV vaccines)
b. nutrition (especially but not only under 5) education/organisation/support
c. basic health services (including education/prevention) relating to the 90% o f cases, 
excluding HIV, Malaria, Bilharzia preventable or treatable at low cost.
d. malaria (plus bilharzia)
e. HIV.
In respect o f the first three there are enough successes to demonstrate that the ways forward 
are understood and enough state plus community/civil society/external actor funding to make 
broad progress is attainable if  given top priority.
Malaria and bilharzia are more problematic. Breakthroughs to prevention are probably less 
than a decade away but need continued African (plus Asian and Latin American) pressure 
and at least symbolic contribution to funding because these are tropical and primarily poor 
people's plagues. Malaria is Africa's greatest killer (especially among under 5's), though 
AIDS related deaths, will soon surpass it and bilharzia is already probably the greatest drag 
on rural health (in morbidity terms) and productivity in several areas and countries. Both are
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rising rapidly and need renewed attention to known (if less than fully effective) prevention 
and control means until vaccines are achieved.
21. HIV/AIDS has yet to be faced squarely probably because the perspectives are so depressing 
and the chances o f a breakthrough to effective prevention or poor person accessible control 
within a decade so low. That is not conducive to achieving what can be achieved in 
catastrophe limitation. The most likely scenario is (over two decades) a rise o f  adult HIV 
positivity to 25% o f adult Africans and to 20% of infants (who die by two) with significant 
decreases in life expectancy and in mouths to feed to healthy hands to earn ratios and 
massive increases in orphans and under (unless malaria deaths are reduced 90%) 5 mortality. 
No breakthrough to effective prevention or long term disease management at poor person 
accessible costs can yet be foreseen.
What can be done?
a. education for comprehension and prevention (which - as Uganda experience indicates 
- can be effective in parallel with the fear generated by personally having knowing 
persons who have died);
b. facilitation (including financial) o f new family entry for orphans;
c. facilitation of/support for family and civil society palliative and hospice care;
d. using all available means (including WTO and WIPO emergency clauses) to force 
generic production/low cost licensing of HIV management drugs to low and lower 
middle income countries. To date efforts by - notably South Africa and Thailand - have 
been iniquitously blocked by pharmaceutical producers backed by the USA and by the 
shameful silence (until very recently) o f WHO and UNDP, and UNICEF's low key 
approach;
e. backing research toward vaccines (including human controlled trial on condition HIV 
strains most relevant to Africa are included). The money to 'justify' corporate research 
on vaccines is in the Northern market. Ensuring poor Africans will benefit requires 
piggybacking main African HIV strain tests on those more directly relevant to the North.
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It is useless to expect companies to invest massively in low return drugs; it is practicable 
to mobilise academic and public sector personnel and funding to complement theirs with 
built in conditions on subsequent pricing.
22. HIV/Aids is neither Armageddon nor Sodom and Gomorrah (either physcially or 
morally). Denial of reality (because it is so horrid) and dubious blame 
casting/scapegoating could make it so. The moral imperatives are promoting practicable 
means to reduce infection, reduced suffering o f doomed persons, better lives for orphans and 
progress toward affordable HIV management and prevention. Those who specialise in 
condemning the afflicted and those heedlessly rushing into risk lack both charity in the 
Pauline sense and relevance to alleviating, containing and reversing the tidal wave o f 
personal, social and economic costs. E.g., the issue is neither whether condoms are moral 
(they rarely cause promiserity) nor a silver bullet (clearly no) but whether in specific contexts 
they can be part o f a containment strategy.
23. Gender issues are not in fast limited to poverty but are less ill grouped with the poverty 
cluster than with conflict or macro economics. Operationally - as opposed to intellectually 
and strategically - gender issues are usually not well addressed by parallel women's 
programmes. Given resource constraints, actual divisions and interactions o f labour and the 
political weakness o f new institutions, these have a tendency to become "Dolls for the girls to 
play with while the men get on with the real business" as two senior female Southern African 
macro finance professionals rather caustically put it. The need for a focal point institution 
to do applied research and analysis; to devise strategic gender objectives with suggestions as 
to how to make them integral to overall "mainline" programming and also to monitor results 
needs to be kept separate for who operates what programmes in which who participates. For 
example Tanzania's' improved child nutrition plus programme (the plus having - at the 
initiative o f its village committees - become women's economic opportunities) is coordinated 
on the technical front by the National Nutrition Institute, served by joint Health and Food and 
Agriculture programmes at District level and operated by Village Committees with UNICEF 
catalytic and technical support. It does reduce child malnutrition (often dramatically and 
holding the gains in dearth years) and, in most cases, women's economic activities. Many - 
perhaps a majority - o f the directly engaged government personnel are women as are virtually
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all o f the village level operators but it is a main stream institution programme focused on key 
objectives in a gender separate way not, a specific 'women's programmes'. Similarly in rural 
public works, Botswana - after efforts at persuasion produced limited results - required equal 
access to be proven by 35% female workers and got it with no signs o f lack o f candidates or 
social opposition. But there is no separate women's work programme - which would rather 
hamper the impact in respect to demonstrating the case for equal access to employment. Per 
contra gender sensitivity may result in men focused sub-programmes. Family planning/child 
spacing education was (often still is) overwhelming delivered to women. Yet many women 
asert (and researchers note) men dominate relevant decisions. As a result family planning 
education is increasingly being directed to men too.
24. As illustrated earlier in respect to water, the specific impact of apparently technical 
measures on women is not necessarily self evident. Much depends on actual divisions o f 
labour and on intra household income/labour budgeting patterns and dynamics, e.g. a shift 
from hand hoeing to animal (or tractor) ploughing usually reduces women's and increases 
men's workload. Increased labour requirements from women on male controlled crops 
grown to be sold do not necessarily disadvantage women (especially if  oxen or donkeys in 
parallel replace hoes). Many women can and do negotiate for more labour on their 
household food or secondary cash crops and/or charge wages (directly or indirectly) for 
additional time.
25. That said, gender and poverty issues are ill researched and, usually, neither adequately
politically focused nor pushed. Most poverty among female headed households relates 
either to high months to hands ratios and/or absence o f acquired skills, not to feminisation of 
poverty as such. Universal primary and applied education and safety nets look more 
practicable ways forward than micro women only initiatives (albeit in agricultural and other 
production support programmes should be keyed to actual potential user groups with specific 
capacities, needs and obstacles, some o f which groups will be dominantly female, or male).
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III.
W AR, DISORDER, GOVERNANCE and HUMAN WELFARE
26. The largest single cause of human misery and of poverty in Africa is war. Extended, 
disabling social conflict short o f war may well be the second largest. The largest single 
cause o f both today (now that the only evident classic "liberation war" is that o f  the Sahara 
Democratic Republic and the Ethiopian/Eritrean the only classic border/prestige war) is 
deficient (mis, mal or non) governance.
27. The political economic aspects of acceptable governance are not that divergent in nature 
from those usually termed social or political:
a. accountability (including both numerical and verbal accounts);
b. transparency;
c. honesty;
d. competence and comprehensibility;
e. capacity to deliver desired services in user friendly forms.
28. Law, Order and Peace, as defined earlier, is a precondition to sustained human and 
economic development. Certainly it is not by itself enough and its terminology may be co­
opted by men o f straw who use it as a cover for repression, injustice, state sponsored disorder 
and selective lawlessness. But without law and order which is visible, accessible and 
friendly to ordinary women in the field, men in the street and children en route to school - 
basically border defense, civilian police and magistrates' courts - there cannot and will not 
be much else. True are cannot eat law and order but scores o f millions o f Africans will bear 
witness that without it there will never be enough to eat.
29. Armed conflict (war, complex political emergencies, conflict - as are prefers) afflicts or has 
in the immediate post afflicted about half o f African states, led to excess deaths o f the order 
o f 10,000,000 since 1980 as well as cumulative output loss o f the order o f $150,000 million.
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These estimates exclude long term, deep broad civil disorder and repression just short o f 
open, general war in - notably - South Africa and Nigeria.
30. As with HIV there is no reason for Africans to be defensive about citations o f war -
usually (most un) civil war - o f atrocities or o f genocide. They are real. They can only be 
overcome by primarily African initiatives and follow through. Further - while this is neither 
a defense o f nor a lessening the seriousness o f African cases - at least half the major 1980- 
1999 wars are outside Africa. San Salvador and Peru, Colombia and Kosovo/Serbia, Bosnia- 
Herzogovina and Georgia/Abkazia, Russia/Chechenya and Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar as well as East Timor and Indonesia, Turkey-Iraq-Iran and the Kurdish people are 
assuredly not in Africa. There are only two war free continents: Antartica (with the 
headstart o f no permanent human inhabitants) and Australia with North America marginal 
depending on how one views regional insurgencies in Mexico and whether Guatemala - 
Honduras - El Salvador - Nicaragua are North or South American. Nor is there much help in 
saying outsiders play on cleavages to turn conflicts violent for their own reasons - true as 
that is. Only Africans can close the cleavages and - in practice - only Africans can make 
peace. UN or bilateral Northern recolonisation under whatever name is unacceptable in the 
North as well as in Africa, if  for different reasons.
31. The standard - or older - view that wars are costly in macro economic and human terms
as well as for most households remains valid. The basic drives to war are hope for future 
gain and fear o f future loss (economic or even o f life) not narrowly defined present gains or 
losses. True some two legged flightless vultures o f adversity do profit by war as - in their 
own minds - do some insurgents swept out o f unemployment or marginalisation and some 
officers. But most supposed beneficiaries are adaptive copers who could, would and 
frequently would prefer to adapt to peace. For most ex-combatants demobilisation with  
reintegration is likely to be and to be seen as preferable to war without end (or for other 
ranks with an ever present end in sight).
32. Ending armed conflict - to be sustainable - must link to reconciliation, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction not in the sense o f literal recreation o f the immediate prewar period which 
contained the seeds o f war but in the context o f the earlier poverty and governance points. At
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the level o f articulation rehabilitation and reconstruction are largely special (and more 
difficult context) poverty reduction and governance improvement strategies.
33. Reconciliation is somewhat different. In Tanzania one can assume broad two way 
communication, trust and interaction between governance and communities (peoples). In 
Acholiland (Gulu and Kitgum Districts) in Uganda since 1986 and especially up to late 1997 
no such assumptions were valid. That a breakthrough is now probably under way is the best 
news for Gulu (and in some ways Kampala) for over a decade. That it has been spearheaded 
by the Acholi Religious Leaders' (Anglican, Catholic, Muslim) Peace Initiative is a point 
religious leaders in general (especially in war torn lands) should reflect upon especially given 
the role o f the Christian Peace Coalition (Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian) o f 
Mozambique in the process leading to the Rome Agreement and on to their endorsement in 
the elections. Why are effective initiatives o f this kind still the unusual rather than the 
normal? How can neighbouring religious groups/leaders assist those in afflicted zones? In 
much o f Africa religious bodies are the most important ones crosscutting rich/poor, 
ethnicity, core/marginalised, government/civil society and even state/insurgent categories. If 
their trumpets are silent who else can blow down the walled citadel o f conflict?
34. Government (central, provincial/state and local) - civil society (e.g. religious groups, trade 
and peasant unions, community bodies, women's and youth bodies, domestic NGOs and 
cause organisations) relations are crucial to decent governance, to mutual understanding o f 
governors/elected and electorates/governed, to participation and accountability and to 
resource mobilisation and efficient use by both sets o f institutions. Neither side in Africa has 
addressed the issues involved holistically and strategically and, too often, tactical differences 
have led to mutually counterproductive stand-offs. Religious groups have frequently been 
relatively hands off in respect to positive actions beyond faith and relief and governments 
slow to recognise their relevance to secular affairs - neither a stance evidently fully consistent 
with 'the world is the Lord's and all that therein is'.
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IV
MACRO POLITICAL ECONOMICS FOR PEOPLE
35. Growth matters, especially for poor people. Like law and order it is never sufficient but -
at least in poor countries - always necessary for almost any type o f human development. It 
is no accident that Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (which did not illustrate great adherence 
to preferences for the poor, for safety nets nor for open/accountable governance) did reduce 
proportionate personal consumption and basic service access poverty very rapidly over 1977- 
97. Africa badly needs 6%  trend, annual real output increases (3%  plus per capita) if 
personal consumption, basic service access, safety net, productive investment and 
governance levels are to change radically and sustainably. Even excluding war cases the 
present trend is at best 4% (and at worst 2.5%), which with 2.5% plus population growth is 
inadequate..
36. Not all macro economic policies especially starting from serious disequilibrium are - or can 
be - pleasant or popular. It does not require an authoritarian to believe that - Mwalimu 
Nyerere linked it to asserting that human beings were the sole ends and evaluators and the 
principal means to development and added the corollary that economic efficiency matters, 
waste is a sin.
37. Government revenue matters. Without it capacity - especially as to basic services and 
safety nets - cannot be extended to all (or almost all) poor people not at a pace consistent 
with 6% overall growth. This is not necessarily a matter o f raising tax rates so much as o f 
improving collection and o f devising overall (not necessarily tax by tax) structures which are 
broadly progressive. In many African states too few, too poorly trained and paid, too little 
honest collectors in ill equipped systems with too many and to complex taxes fail to collect at 
least a third o f what existing rates and marginal tax bases should provide. The beneficiaries 
are rarely poor people (nor are efficient business people particularly likely to be the main 
winners either) but rather human variants on the ominous, huge, saturnine carrion eating Nile 
storks.
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38. That point leads to a brutal reality: Pay, Professionalism, Probity and Productivity in the
£
Public Service are not separable. Unless public service wages for - e.g. - constables, nurses, 
primary school teachers, extension workers and rural water technicians (usually nearly 2/3 of 
public servants) are at or rising toward 2/3 to 100% of absolute poverty lines for urban 
households o f 5 or 6, neither adequate probity, professionalism nor productivity can be 
achieved. Need (not greed) will force absenteeism, conflict o f interest, direct collection o f 
user (or evader for tax officers) fee collection. And the schools o f hapless minnows will 
provide cover for the sharks o f greed based corruption. The external response o f partly 
filling holes by providing a few technical assistance persons at 10 times the cost o f qualified 
citizens and international NGOs, (at average cost 3 times as high to substitute for local and 
central government service provision) is economic lunacy as well as deeply debilitatory and 
corrosive o f  African states and o f domestic social actors.
39. Government expenditure per capita on basic services in constant prices in SSA as a
whole appears to have fallen by half. The lesser overall expenditure decline has been eaten 
up by war and debt service. Numbers employed are too few, too ill trained, too ill paid to 
achieve minimum competent governance levels e.g. to educate all o f Mali's primary school 
pupils in classes o f 45 would require at least quadrupling primary school teachers and 
doubling the non-uniformed public service. The only major savings are from peace and 
lower debt service (Jubilee or other).
40. The need for more efficient spending (human oriented and even potentially sound policies 
can be very poor payoff in practice (e.g. most o f Tanzania's in direct support o f agriculture). 
Different emphasis in service provision (primarily to moving rapidly to universal basic public 
service and safety net cover) are central and easy to state, or even to outline, but much harder 
to articulate, operate, review and preserve from special interest erosion (especially when it 
purports to be on behalf o f poor people as all lenders - public or private - to Tanzanian small 
farming households have special pleaded for over 35 years). With focus and efficiency $40 
per capita for basic services and $10 (on average) for safety nets on recurrent budget i.e. $50 
per capita which implies a total government budget o f $60-70 recurrent excluding debt 
service which at 20% tax/output ratio is possible with output o f $400 per person, $25 net 
external support and $35-40 per capita investment budget. Only the very poorest SSA
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economies literally could not reach these parameters in 5 to 10 years if they achieved 6% 
growth, poor person friendly governance and peace.
41. Exports matter. The only foreign exchange flows basically under the control o f a country 
and its people are those derived from exports (including remittances o f overseas workers). 
The alternative o f enterprise investment is uncertain - and often expensive - while that o f 
external assistance is secularly declining, condition ridden and often demeaning. That is not 
the opinion o f would be globalising capitalists alone - Mwalimu and his great Finance 
Minister Amir Jamal argued those propositions from 1970. Exclusion from global economic 
advance was the key danger as perceived by Mwalimu both in the 1960's and - with the 
South Commission - in the 1990's. There is no inherent reason exports need be anti poor 
people - as producers, wage earners and recipients o f export enterprise surplus financed 
public services and safety nets (e.g. Botswana) they can be beneficiaries. The scandal o f the 
Niger Delta is what Nigeria has done with its oil revenues and the laxness of its 
regulation of pollution far more basically that it is o f company payments or policies 
(deplorable as the latter have been in respect to air, water and soil pollution).
42. External context is an area only marginally under African control. But even that marginal 
influence - by Africans and their state/social actors and by external friends o f Africa is not 
now being used effectively. Some possibilities are:
a. restructuring external support/aid (which will on balance continue to decline in real 
per capita terms) away from high cost expatriates and very large scale infrastructure 
toward basic services on both recurrent and capital accounts (including initial R-R-R and 
basic salaries enhancement);
b. building on present mobilisation, publicity and - to a point - financial gains from the 
Jubilee campaign which (except in its unwise entry into how the North should finance 
writedowns) is a template for focused, genuinely North-South pressure for focused, at 
least in part attainable objectives;
c. using Jubilee to craft parallel WTO, ILO ( a better forum to set minimum labour 
standards for WTO), WIPO/WHO campaigns focused on red South (African priorities)
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and, where appropriate, separate from New Jerusalem or Zero Growth Ecological purism,
e.g. biotechnology to increase iron or protein content and/or reduce drought vulnerability 
would benefit primary Africa and Asia. This implies finance via the International Crop 
Research Institutes (ICRISAT including Ibadan in Africa) whether the actual research is 
GM company or Institute done and licensing/royalties at levels allowing actual African 
access. Similar considerations apply to HIV and Malaria vaccine research. Because no 
African state uses the maximum tariff - infrastructure support - research - subsidy - 
dumping barriers it is now allowed by WTO, it is disingenuous to say the main threat to 
farmers is WTO liberalisation - disingenuous and a smokescreen for domestic resource 
allocation to other ends.
d. negotiating genuine contracts to meet specified targets relevant to ozone layer, species 
diversity, global warming concerns in return for specified external resource provision for 
African priority environmental protection (by anti erosion, desertification, air pollution) 
overlapping and consistent - but not identical with global (real Northwestern?) priorities.
43. The above agenda will not tip the global context from extreme African unfriendliness - it 
could reduce the imbalance. However desirable, calling for a full stop to globalisation, 
doubling aid transfers and allowing fully unilateral preferential access to all markets for all 
African states will not work - as nakedly evidenced at the end o f the Uruguay WTO Round 
and both governmental and INGO current approaches to the proposed Seattle Round.
44. Regionalism - or sub regional Pan Africanism - represents a renaissance, an opportunity and 
a challenge to states and social sector actors alike. Compared to 1980 there is substantial 
progress on economic coordination, calamity management/famine prevention, security 
(sometimes defined to include food, livelihood and freedom from crime) but very unevenly 
and imperfectly. To date this has been more sub-regional -notably in SADC and ECOW AS - 
than continental where UNECA has declined, the OAU given some verbal but very little 
applied leadership and the ADB been all too occupied with survival. Greater participation - 
with survival. Greater participation - with social actors and the private sector - has begun to 
take root (especially in SADC), but none o f the parties appears to have either a strategic 
agenda nor clear views on what interaction can achieve beyond vague general affirmations.
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Given the limited resources o f African states, the real potential for specialisation and division 
o f labour (not only in markets and marketed production) and the evident potential for sub­
regional security provision and governance standard setting there is a priority case to 
conceptualise, to extend and deepen dialogue and to sharpen action. African Regionalism 
and Sub Regionalism are ultimately about Self Determination, Self Reliance and Self 
Respect. As such they are central to macro issues, to peace and security, to good governance 
and - at least indirectly and by sharing best practice - to poverty reduction.
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